Tariffs are the most obvious trade barrier, literally and visibly raising the cost of traded goods
More and more trade barriers today are not literal trade taxes (countries have committed to lowering tariffs)
In general, we call these non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs)
We will examine two today:
Import quota places a quantitative limit on the number of imported units allowed
Export subsidy is a subsidy (payment to encourage production) of exported goods
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Suppose Belgium opens up to international trade
World Supply of sugar at 4¢/lb
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Trade benefits Belgian consumers at expense of Belgian sugar producers
We can trace Belgium’s import demand from the world based on the world price
Note at a price of ¢10 there is no import demand, all sugar can be produced in Belgium
We can trace Belgium’s import demand from the world based on the world price
Note at a price of ¢10 there is no import demand, all sugar can be produced in Belgium
We have been assuming the world supply of sugar is perfectly elastic at 4¢
Sets equilibrium amount of imports in Belgium, 12 bn lbs imported
Suppose the government puts a 4 bn lb quota on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government puts a 4 bn lb quota on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government puts a 4 bn lb quota on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government puts a 4 bn lb quota on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government puts a 4 bn lb quota on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Quota will generate quota rents: 4 bn lbs × 0.04/lb = $0.160 bn
Under the quota:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Under the quota:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Under the quota:
Two new sources of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Under the quota:
Two new sources of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Under the quota:
Two new sources of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Can also see this in the import market
Decline of imports at higher price in Belgium
Size of DWL in import market = sum of both DWL triangles in Belgian market ($0.160 bn)
Decrease in consumer surplus:
Increase in producer surplus:
Quota rents:
Deadweight losses
Government gets tax revenues from tariffs, but who gets the quota rents?
Government grants licenses for the “right to import” to firms (domestic or foreign)
Government could auction licenses to the highest bidder outright; sell them to firms
Unfortunately, this is rarely done
Government often merely gives permissions or licenses to various firms, government would get no revenue out of this
Sounds like these firms just get the licenses for free?
It’s impossible to give something away for free in politics! People will always expend resources to compete to make sure they are the one that gets the handout
Competition between firms seeking the rent will waste resources
Anne Kreuger
1934-
“In many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are pervasive facts of life. These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete for the rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets.”
“When quantitative restrictions are imposed upon and effectively constrain imports, an import license is a valuable commodity...It has always been recognized that there are some costs associated with licensing: paperwork, the time spent by entrepreneurs in obtaining their licenses, the cost of the administrative apparatus necessary to issue licenses, and so on. Here, the argument is carried one step further: in many circumstances resources are devoted to competing for those licenses,” (p.848).
Kreuger, Anne, 1974, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 84(4): 833-850
Kreuger, Anne, 1974, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 84(4): 833-850
Until 1970s, U.S. automakers dominated U.S. auto market and sold very different varieties of cars that most Americans preferred over foreign cars
Oil crises of the 1970s, U.S. car production fell by about 30%, 300,000 lost auto jobs in Detroit, imports rose from 18%-29% of all car sales
Japanese car manufacturers increasing share of the market with cheaper, more fuel-efficient cars
U.S. and Japan negotiated a trade agreement that limited Japanese auto exports to the U.S. to 1.86 million in 1981, and to 1.85 million for 1984-1985 (failed to renew in 1985)
Volunetary Export Restraints (VERs) Japan “agreed” to restrict its auto exports to U.S. (for fear of wider-ranging U.S. protectionism if this failed)
U.S. automakers used the time to increase quality, but not passed onto consumers — U.S. automakers earned $6 billion in profit in 1983, $10 billion in 1984, $8 billion in 1985
American public had to pay about $660 higher per American car, and $1,300 per Japanese car in 1984
Estimated total cost of VER to U.S. consumers was $15.7 billion (1984-1981), and 44,000 U.S. jobs protected.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Autarky price: $10/bushel, 10 billion bushels exchanged within U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Autarky price: $10/bushel, 10 billion bushels exchanged within U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Autarky price: $10/bushel, 10 billion bushels exchanged within U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Autarky price: $10/bushel, 10 billion bushels exchanged within U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in the U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Autarky price: $10/bushel, 10 billion bushels exchanged within U.S.
Consider, for example, the wheat market in U.S.
Domestic Demand for wheat in U.S.
Domestic Supply of wheat in U.S.
Suppose U.S. opens up to international trade
World Demand for U.S. wheat at $12/bushel
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Trade benefits U.S. producers at expense of U.S. consumers
We can trace U.S.’s export demand to the world based on the world price
Note at a price of $10 there is no export demand, all wheat will be sold in U.S.
We can trace U.S.’s export supply to the world based on the world price
Note at a price of $10 there is no export supply, all wheat will be sold in U.S.
We have been assuming the world demand of wheat is perfectly elastic at $12
Sets equilibrium amount of exports in U.S., 4 bn bushels exported
Suppose the U.S. government pays a $4/bushel subsidy on wheat exports
At new domestic wheat price of $16/bushel
Suppose the U.S. government pays a $4/bushel subsidy on wheat exports
At new domestic wheat price of $16/bushel
Suppose the U.S. government pays a $4/bushel subsidy on wheat exports
At new domestic wheat price of $16/bushel
Suppose the U.S. government pays a $4/bushel subsidy on wheat exports
At new domestic wheat price of $16/bushel
Suppose the U.S. government pays a $4/bushel subsidy on wheat exports
At new domestic wheat price of $16/bushel
Subsidy is a government payment, so taxpayers must spend money: $4/bushel × 12 bn bushels = \$48 bn
Under the subsidy:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Under the subsidy:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Under the subsidy:
New source of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Why no left triangle? The consumption loss to consumers is transferred to producers
Can also see this in the export market
More exports at higher price in U.S.
Decrease in consumer surplus:
Increase in producer surplus:
Government spending expense:
Deadweight losses
Domestic consequences of subsidy:
A $56 bn gain to a small group of domestic sugar producers at a $24 bn expense to consumers, $48 bn expense to taxpayers
Some of the biggest effects of the European Union (EU) have been on trade:
Members of the EU & Schengen agreement have removed all tariffs between member countries
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is essentially one giant continental export subsidy of European agricultural products
Export subsidies are illegal under current international agreements
However, many nations provide them in disguised or not-so-disguised forms
Export subsidies are a form of “dumping”, where a country sells a good at a lower price in a foreign market than it charges at home
Goal is to gain market share in the foreign country and reduce foreign competition
Similar to predatory pricing in industrial organization between firms in a market (price below cost to drive out competitors)
Very hard to “prove”
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