Economists generally agree that free trade best enhances overall social welfare
Yet free trade is rare in the world
Two questions:
This was in 2015, before the Trump Administration!
Most common way to restrict trade is through a tariff (historically called a “duty”), a tax specifically targeted towards internationally-traded goods
Import tariff: tax on imported goods
Export tariff: tax on exported goods
Ad valorem tariff taxes a fixed percentage of the value of a good
Specific tariff taxes a fixed sum per unit of a good
Compound tariff combines ad valorem and specific tariffs
U.S. tariff schedule on imported woven flax fabrics, Harmonized Tariff Schedule, United States International Trade Commission Chapter 53, p. 53-4
Effect of a tariff in a “small” country
Effect of a tariff in a “large” nation
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within Belgium
Consider, for example, the sugar market in Belgium
Domestic Demand for sugar in Belgium
Domestic Supply of sugar in Belgium
Suppose Belgium opens up to international trade
World Supply of sugar at 4¢/lb
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Under international trade:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Trade benefits Belgian consumers at expense of Belgian sugar producers
We can trace Belgium’s import demand from the world based on the world price
Note at a price of ¢10 there is no import demand, all sugar can be produced in Belgium
We can trace Belgium’s import demand from the world based on the world price
Note at a price of ¢10 there is no import demand, all sugar can be produced in Belgium
We have been assuming the world supply of sugar is perfectly elastic at 4¢
Sets equilibrium amount of imports in Belgium, 12 bn lbs imported
Suppose the government levies a 4¢/lb tariff on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government levies a 4¢/lb tariff on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government levies a 4¢/lb tariff on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government levies a 4¢/lb tariff on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Suppose the government levies a 4¢/lb tariff on sugar imports
At new domestic sugar price of 8¢/lb
Tariff is a tax, so government earns revenue:
Under the tariff:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Under the tariff:
Consumer surplus = WTP - p*
Producer surplus = p* - WTA
Under the tariff:
Two new sources of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Under the tariff:
Two new sources of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Under the tariff:
Two new sources of market inefficiency created, “deadweight loss (DWL)”
Can also see this in the import market
Decline of imports at higher price in Belgium
Size of DWL in import market = sum of both DWL triangles in Belgian market ($0.160 bn)
Decrease in consumer surplus:
Increase in producer surplus:
Government tax revenue:
Deadweight losses
Domestic consequences of tariff:
A $240m gain to a small group of domestic sugar producers at a $460m expense to consumers
Concentrated benefit, dispersed cost each consumer pays $0.04/lb more for sugar
Harm to foreigners: hurts exporters and consumers in other countries from lost trade
A “large country” has a sufficiently large domestic demand to affect international prices
The decrease in domestic demand from an import tariff (from higher import price) is sufficiently large to lower the world price of the good
This is called the “terms of trade effect” of a tariff
Consider, for example, the sugar market in the U.S.
Autarky price: 10¢/lb, 10 billion lbs exchanged within U.S.
Suppose U.S. opens up to international trade
World Supply of sugar at 4¢/lb:
Suppose U.S. opens up to international trade
World Supply of sugar at 4¢/lb:
We can trace U.S.’s import demand from the world based on the world price
Because U.S. is a large country, the world supply curve (exports from other countries) to U.S. is upward sloping
Imagine autarky equilibrium price in exporting countries is 2¢; once they can get higher price in U.S., start exporting
Sets equilibrium amount of imports in U.S., 12 bn lbs imported at 4¢
Now suppose U.S. imposes a 4¢/lb tariff on imported sugar
Increase in costs to world sugar exporters decreases world export supply by 4¢/lb
New equilibrium is for U.S. to import 6 bn lbs at 7¢/lb
Exporters to U.S. recieve net price (after taxes) of 3¢/lb
Important: raise in price to U.S. consumers is less than the full 4¢/lb!
Now suppose U.S. imposes a 4¢/lb tariff on imported sugar
Due to the terms of trade effect, world price of sugar will fall from less U.S. demand (to 3¢/lb)
Now suppose U.S. imposes a 4¢/lb tariff on imported sugar
Due to the terms of trade effect, world price of sugar will fall from less U.S. demand (to 3¢/lb)
The 4¢/lb is levied on this new, lower world price of sugar, raising price of sugar in U.S. to 7¢/lb
At new domestic price of 7¢/lb:
Note the changes are not as much as it was to the small country
Loss to U.S. consumer surplus (but less than for small country)
Gain to U.S. producer surplus (but less than for small country)
Tariff will collect revenue for government
DWLs from productive and consumption inefficiencies
Tariff will collect revenue for government
DWLs from productive and consumption inefficiencies
But: gain in tariff revenue exceeds inefficiency (DWL)!
Area D is the Terms of trade gain for U.S. (loss to world) due to tariff
U.S. deadweight loss (A+B) < U.S. tariff revenue (C+D)
Foreign loses deadweight loss (F) from lost export opportunities
Welfare changes:
A “beggar thy neighbor” approach to increasing national welfare
Both countries start out with same world price, imports, domestic demand and supply
With free trade:
Country | p∗ | q∗ | Domestic q | Imports | CS | PS | Tax Revenue | DWL |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Both | $0.04 | 16 bn | 4 bn | 12 bn | $1.280 bn | $0.080 bn | $0 | $0 |
Both countries start out with same world price, imports, domestic demand and supply
With free trade:
Country | p∗ | q∗ | Domestic q | Imports | CS | PS | Tax Revenue | DWL |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Both | $0.04 | 16 bn | 4 bn | 12 bn | $1.280 bn | $0.080 bn | $0 | $0 |
Country | p∗ | q∗ | Domestic q | Imports | Δ CS | Δ PS | Tax Revenue | DWL | Δ Net Welfare |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Small (Belgium) | $0.08 | 12 bn | 8 bn | 4 bn | -$0.560 bn | $0.240 bn | $0.160 bn | -$0.160 bn | -$0.160 bn |
Large (U.S.) | $0.07 | 13 bn | 7 bn | 6 bn | -$0.435 bn | $0.165 bn | $0.240 bn | -$0.090 bn | $0.030 bn |
For a large country, a tariff decreases volume of trade but improves country’s terms of trade
Net effect is a slight increase in (big) country’s welfare
Thus, there exists some optimal tariff τ>0 that maximizes net gains from tradeoff between terms of trade improvements against decline in trade
τ=0: free trade
For low levels of τ, terms of trade gain exceed deadweight loss
For high levels of τ, deadweight loss exceeds terms of trade gain
Extremely high levels of τ will close off trade completely
Some optimal τ⋆ that maximizes welfare gain to importer
τ⋆=1εx
Economic theory shows the theoretical possibility of how tariffs might increase national welfare
Regardless, tariffs harm welfare of trading partners (exporting countries)
Politically and practically, trading partners might retaliate against tariffs with their own tariffs
How much do tariffs protect domestic industry?
Seems logical to just count the percent an ad valorem tariff raises price over free trade price
If the country is “large”, part of the tariff’s effect will be to lower foreign export prices rather than just raise domestic prices
Tariffs may have different effects on different stages of production for a good
Better to think about the effective rate of protection as the percent change in domestic value added
Example: Suppose cars sell on world market for $8,000, and car parts sell for $6,000. If a country buys car parts and assembles them into cars, the domestic value added is: $8,000−$6,000=$2,000
Suppose Home wants to develop a domestic auto assembly industry
Home places a 25% tariff on imported cars, raising the price of cars in Home to $10,000
Domestic value added changes by: $4,000−$2,000$2,000×100=100%
Suppose Home instead wants to develop a domestic car parts industry
Home places a 25% tariff on imported car parts, raising the price of car parts in Home to $7,500
Suppose Home instead wants to develop a domestic car parts industry
What about for assemblers of cars?
We can see that the structure of tariffs often impact different stages of the production process differently
Here, a tariff on car parts gave 25% more protection to domestic car parts producers, at the expense of a 75% loss to domestic car assemblers
In general, we see that effective rate of protection ≠ nominal tariff rate
Tariffs on foreign inputs generate negative effective rates of protection, and tariffs on final products generate positive eeffective rates of protection for a country’s domestic industry
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